St. John's Law Review
Volume 52, Spring 1978, Number 3

Article 12

WCL § 29: 1975 Amendments to Worker's Compensation Law
Held Applicable to Actions Accruing or Commenced Prior to
Effective Date
Kimberlee Bogen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

19781

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

evincing a marital relationship is not sufficient to constitute
"holding out" under DRL § 248, the Northrup Court has effectively
placed a bar to the use of judicial discretion in cases where injustice
may result.
Unfortunately, the problem raised by the Northrup holding
does not lend itself readily to legislative solution. While the legislature can act to amend the statutory language requiring "holding
out," '92 it would be impossible to provide detailed standards to be
utilized in determining whether a particular relationship justifies
invocation of the relief provisions of DRL § 248. Such standards can
be developed only on a case by case basis. It is therefore suggested
that, in deciding future cases arising under DRL § 248, the courts
should give the broadest possible effect to the concession of the
Northrup majority that "conduct may constitute a holding out."' 93
Lawrence J. Santoro
WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW

WCL § 29: 1975 amendments to Worker's CompensationLaw held
applicable to actions accruingor commenced prior to effective date
Section 29 of the Worker's Compensation Law'94 allows an injured employee to claim compensation benefits without forfeiting
the right to bring an action against a nonemployee tortfeasor.'95
"143 N.Y.2d at 573, 373 N.E.2d at 1225, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 1001 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
One month after Northrup was decided, the New York State Senate unanimously passed a
bill which would allow courts to eliminate alimony even though the former wife had not
represented herself to be married to her paramour. N.Y. Times, March 19, 1978, at 45, col.
5. Similar legislation was introduced in the Assembly, but did not receive sufficient support
for passage.
, 43 N.Y.2d at 571, 373 N.E.2d at 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 999; see note 177 supra.
'" The New York Legislature recently amended the short title of the Workmen's Compensation Law to read "Worker's Compensation Law." Ch. 79, [1978] N.Y. Laws 253
(McKinney).
M"N.Y. WoRK. Comp. LAW § 29(1) (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978) provides in pertinent
part:
If an employee entitled to compensation. . . be injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, such injured employee, or in case
of death, his dependents, need not elect whether to take compensation and medical
benefits under [workmen's compensation] or to pursue his remedy against such
other but may take such compensation and medical benefits and. . . pursue his
remedy against such other subject to the provisions of this chapter . . . . [Tihe
state insurance fund. . . or insurance carrier liable for the payment of. . . compensation . . . shall have a lien on the proceeds of any recovery . . . whether by
judgment, settlement or otherwise, after the deduction of the reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorney's fees, incurred in effecting such recovery, to
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Although, under the statute, the compensation carrier has a lien on
any recovery up to the amount of benefits it has paid the injured
employee,19 prior to 1975 the employee was required to bear the full
burden of litigation expenses." 7 On June 10, 1975, however, section
29 was amended to permit an employee who has recovered from a
third-party tortfeasor to petition the court for an equitable apportionment of the "reasonable and necessary" expenses of litigation,
including attorneys' fees.198 While the remedial legislation was to
the extent of the total amount of compensation awarded ....

Should the em-

ployee or his dependents secure a recovery from [a third party] whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise, such employee or dependents may apply ...for an
order apportioning the reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorneys'
fees, incurred in effecting such recovery. Such expenditures shall be equitably
apportioned by the court between the employee or his dependents and the lienor.
"I Prior to 1937, § 29 required an injured employee or his dependents, in event of his
death, to elect statutory workmen's compensation benefits or to pursue a third-party personal
injury action. Ch. 816, § 29, [1913] N.Y. Laws 2293; see Curtin v. City of New York, 287
N.Y. 338, 340, 39 N.E.2d 903, 904 (1942). If the employee chose to receive compensation
benefits, his right to bring a third-party tort action was automatically assigned to the compensation carrier. Ch. 816, § 29, [1913] N.Y. Laws 2293; see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods
Mfg. Co., 239 N.Y. 273, 146 N.E. 377 (1925); Sabatino v. Thomas Crimmins Contracting Co.,
102 Misc. 172, 168 N.Y.S. 495 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 186 App. Div. 891, 172
N.Y.S. 917 (1st Dep't 1918). If, however, the employee pursued the third-party action, his
claim to compensation benefits was lost unless his recovery from the third party was less than
the statutory compensation amount. In such a case, the compensation carrier was liable for
the deficiency. Ch. 816, § 29, [1913] N.Y. Laws 2293; see Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., Inc.,
267 N.Y. 410, 196 N.E. 308 (1935) (Lehman, J.). This binding election of remedies received
considerable criticism. See, e.g., 2A A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 73.30
(1976) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]; Behrendt, The Rationale of the Election of Remedies
Under Workmen's CompensationActs, 12 U. Cm. L. REv. 231 (1945).
In 1937, the statute was modified to permit the employee or his dependents to collect
benefits without automatically relinquishing the right to pursue a third-party action. Ch.684,
§ 1, [1937] N.Y. Laws 1556-57; see 7 FORDHAM L. REv. 282 (1938). To prevent double recovery
for a single injury, the carrier was granted a lien on any recovery equal to the amount of
compensation awarded. Ch. 684, § 1, [1937] N.Y. Laws 1556.
1" Ch. 684, § 1, [1937] N.Y. Laws 1556-57. Prior to the 1975 amendments, expenses
incurred by the employee in litigating a third-party claim were paid from the recovery fund
before the carrier received its reimbursement. Thus, the litigation expenses were, in effect, a
prior lien on the recovery, while the carrier's claim represented a secondary lien. LARSON,
supra note 196, § 74.32, at 14-229 & n.53. The effect was that the carrier received full
reimbursement without being required to share any of the expenses of litigation. Atleson,
Workmen's Compensation: Third PartyActions and the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees,
19 BUFFALO L. REv. 515, 526, 537 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Atleson]; see Sarancza v.
Roberts and Grancelli, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 415, 245 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1963), aff'd mem., 22 App. Div. 2d 764, 253 N.Y.S.2d 252 (2d Dep't 1964). The injured
employee, the focus of both tort and compensation law, had to bear the full burden of the
legal expenses. Atleson, supra, at 539.
199Ch. 190, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 293 (McKinney). The inequities in the prior provisions for payment of legal expenses, see note 197 supra, were the subject of strong criticism,
and legislative correction frequently was urged. See, e.g., Kussack v. Ring Constr. Corp., 1
App. Div. 2d 634, 635, 153 N.Y.S.2d 646, 648 (3d Dep't 1956), aff'd mem., 4 N.Y.2d 1011,
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"take effect immediately," 9' 9 its applicability to causes of action
accruing or commenced before its effective date remained unclear.2 0
Recently, in Becker v. Huss Co.,2"' the Court of Appeals resolved
this question by holding the amendment applicable to judgments or
settlements obtained after June 10, 1975, regardless of when the
underlying cause of action accrued or when the lawsuit was commenced.20
Becker involved five cases in which the carrier had paid compensation benefits and consequently had a lien on any proceeds
arising from the injured employee's third-party tort action.2 3 Four
of the injured plaintiffs had initiated tort actions prior to June 10,
1975, but did not negotiate a settlement or receive a judgment until
after that date.2 4 In the fifth case, the injured employee had been
awarded a judgment for damages in 1974 but had not been paid at
the time the apportionment amendment became effective.0 5 In each
152 N.E.2d 540, 177 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1958); Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission
Relating to the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees in Third-Party Actions Under Workmen's
Compensation Law §§ 29 and 227, [1975] N.Y. LAW Rav. CoMM'N REP., reprinted in [1975]
N.Y. Laws 1551 (McKinney); Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission Relating to
the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees in Third-Party Actions Under Workmen's Compensation Law §§ 29 and 227, [1974] N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP., reprinted in [1974] N.Y. Laws
1904 (McKinney); Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission Relating to the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees in Third-Party Actions Under Workmen's Compensation Law §§
29 and 227, [19711 N.Y. LAw REv. COMM'N REP., reprinted in [1971] N.Y. Laws 2333
(McKinney); NEw YORK STATE BAR Ass'N REPORT OF SpScIAL COMM. APPONTED TO STUY Tm
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw (1957). See also Edelman, PracticalProblemsin Handling the
CompensationLien and Attorneys' Fees, 12 FORUM 666, 668-71 (1977). One court held that §
29 was an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process since it lacked a
provision requiring the carrier to share in the burden of legal expenses. Koutrakos v. Long
Island College Hosp., 78 Misc. 2d 39, 355 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974) (mem.),
rev'd, 47 App. Div. 2d 500, 368 N.Y.S.2d 528 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'd mem., 39 N.Y.2d 1026,
355 N.E.2d 301, 387 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1976). The appellate division, however, reversed, finding
that the matter was for the legislature to correct. 47 App. Div. 2d at 506, 368 N.Y.S.2d at
533.
"' Ch. 190, § 3, [1975] N.Y. Laws 294 (McKinney).
2 One lower court held the apportionment amendment to be applicable to recoveries
occurring after its enactment even though the cause of action accrued and the suit was
commenced prior to June 10, 1975. Cardillo v. Long Island College Hosp., 86 Misc. 2d 438,
382 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976) (mem.).
'o, 43 N.Y.2d 527, 373 N.E.2d 1205, 402 N.Y.S.2d 980 (1978).
Id. at 537, 373 N.E.2d at 1210, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The method of calculating the
compensation lienor's share of the litigation expenses was also at issue. Ia. at 537, 373 N.E.2d
at 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982; see note 219 infra.
10 43 N.Y.2d at 536, 373 N.E.2d at 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 981-82.
lu Id. at 536-37, 373 N.E.2d at 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The workmen's compensation
benefits paid by the State Insurance Fund to the five injured employees ranged from $536.78
to over $19,000. Id. at 536, 373 N.E.2d at 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
s Id. at 537, 373 N.E.2d at 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982. In Francev. Abstract Title Div.
of Title GuaranteeCo., a judgment was entered on December 16, 1974, but was not paid until
January 1976. Id. at 537, 373 N.E.2d at 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
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case, the carrier argued that the amendment's provisions were not
applicable to lawsuits commenced before its enactment. 28 The appellate division rejected this argument and held the carrier responsible for a proportionate share of the employees' expenses in all five
cases.20 The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, but held that the
apportionment amendment was not applicable to the fifth case,
since that action had proceeded to judgment before June 10, 1975.08
2
The Becker Court reviewed the relevant legislative history 11
and found no conclusive indications of whether the 1975 amendment was intended to apply to actions pending at the time it became effective. 210 Rejecting a rigid adherence to axiomatic "canons
of statutory construction, ' 21 1 the Court had "no choice but to determine the retroactive reach of the statute influenced by policy considerations and the practicalities. '2 12 Writing for a unanimous
101
Id.,

373 N.E.2d at 1208, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982; see note 211 infra.
43 N.Y.2d at 536, 373 N.E.2d at 1206-07, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
21 Id. at 537, 373 N.E.2d at 1210, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982; see note 205 supra.
10 43 N.Y.2d at 537-40, 373 N.E.2d at 1207-08, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982-84; see notes 196198 supra.
"1043 N.Y.2d at 540, 373 N.E.2d at 1207-08, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 984. The Becker Court did
not find guidance in the amendment's provision that it "take effect immediately," since prior
decisions had rejected such language as a basis for applying new statutes to pending actions.
Id. at 541, 373 N.E.2d at 1209, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 984-85 (citing Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N.Y.
180, 61 N.E.2d 435 (1945) (construing section of former General Corporation Law); In re
Miller's Estate, 110 N.Y. 216, 18 N.E. 139 (1888) (construing estate tax provision)).
"1 43 N.Y.2d at 540, 373 N.E.2d at 1209, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 984. The carrier argued that,
absent a clear statutory provision to the contrary, traditional rules of statutory construction
require that amendments be applied only prospectively. Id. at 537, 373 N.E.2d at 1208, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 984; see Phillips v. Agway, Inc., 88 Misc. 2d 1087, 389 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct.
Cattaraugus County 1976); N.Y. STATUTES § 52 (McKinney 1971); 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.09 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973). The employees, however, argued that
because the amendment is remedial, the "canons of construction" required retroactive application. 43 N.Y.2d at 537, 373 N.E.2d at 1208, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 984; see N.Y. STATUTES §§ 5455 (McKinney 1971); 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.09 (4th ed. C. Sands
1973).
While acknowledging their value as useful tools in statutory interpretation, the Becker
Court noted that these "canons" "should not be abused as talismanic." 43 N.Y.2d at 540,
373 N.E.2d at 1209, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 984. One commentator has stated: "[T]here is no refuge
in absolutes. Textbook rules on the construction of statutes are useful and indispensable as
tools to be used with discretion and discrimination. They are not substitutes for the appreciation of an individual situation and for the choice between conflicting values." W. FRIEDMANN,
LAW IN A CHANGING SOCMrY 61 (1959); see Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keepnews, 41 N.Y.2d
982, 983, 363 N.E.2d 708, 709, 395 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (1977) (mem.).
2,2 43 N.Y.2d at 541, 373 N.E.2d at 1209, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 985. The Court stated:
It is possible, of course, that the Legislature had views on retroactivity, but
failed to express them. Study of the act and its history is inconclusive and, therefore, suggests at least two other possibilities: the gap may be a true one, that is, an
unintentional legislative omission; or, elaboration may have been deliberately left
to the courts. Whatever the cause, the court has no choice but to determine the
"1
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panel, Chief Judge Breitel stated that the broad social purposes and
inherent flexibility underlying the Worker's Compensation Law
should be determinative in construing the scope of the 1975 amendment.1 3 Recognizing that the compensation system is actually "a
method. . . for implementing an injured employee's right to monetary recovery,"2 " ' the Court noted that the benefits and burdens
25
arising from the statute have always been subject to reallocation. 1
Similarly, the 1975 amendment represented nothing more, in the
Court's view, than a new distribution of the burden of legal expenses.216 Thus, application of the amendment's provisions to causes of
action accruing or commenced before June 10, 1975, would not impair any of the carrier's existing substantive rights. Furthermore,
Chief Judge Breitel observed that the right to reimbursement held
by the carrier is contingent and subject to fluctuations in value
"depending upon who initiates the tort action, against whom the
action is brought, and whether the recovery is subject to allocation

Id.

retroactive reach of the statute influenced by policy considerations and the practicalities. But, the relative disciplined freedom with which the court may thus approach the issue results directly from the Legislature's invitation, be it deliberate
or inadvertent.

Id. at 541-42, 373 N.E.2d at 1209-10, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see notes 214-215 infra.
"1 43 N.Y.2d at 541, 373 N.E.2d at 1209-10, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 985. Workmen's compensation in America is a twentieth century development designed to provide a satisfactory method
for handling occupational disabilities by replacing common-law negligence remedies with the
concept of strict industrial liability in the form of compulsory insurance. See CHAMBER OF
2

COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (1974); 1 LARSON, supra note 196,

§

1. In exchange for statutory benefits, the injured employee surrenders all rights and remedies
which he might otherwise have against his employer. See N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 11
(McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1977-1978). Fault is no longer an issue, and common-law defenses
such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk are immaterial in the compensation
scheme. See N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1965); E. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY
IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 12 (1961); J. RHODES, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1917). The

system was intended to provide a remedy even in circumstances where recovery would be
unavailable in an ordinary common-law action. In re Petrie, 215 N.Y. 335, 338, 109 N.E. 549,
550 (1915). The remedial purpose of the Worker's Compensation Law has resulted in extremely liberal judicial construction, engendering the common belief that "if the Workmen's
Compensation Board or the courts can dream up any possible basis for recovery, the claimant
will recover." Comment, New York Workmen's CompensationLaw: What the ClaimantMust
Prove to Recover an Award, 36 ALB. L. REV. 543, 543 (1972).
215 43 N.Y.2d at 541, 373 N.E.2d at 1210, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see, e.g., Mlodozeniec v.
Worthington Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 21, 189 N.Y.S.2d 468 (3d Dep't 1959), aff'd mem., 8
N.Y.2d 918, 168 N.E.2d 834, 204 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1960), cert. denied per curiam, 364 U.S. 628
(1961) (amendment expanding scope of coverage for silicosis held applicable to employee
injured before its enactment although employee would have been unable to recover under
prior law); DiMartino v. Mountain Valley Water Co., 270 App. Div. 968, 62 N.Y.S.2d 174
..(3d Dep't 1946) (per curiam).
21143 N.Y.2d at 541-42, 373 N.E.2d at 1210, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
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based either on comparative negligence or on relative degrees of
culpability among joint tort-feasors. ' 17 In view of the inchoate nature of the carrier's rights under section 29, the Court reasoned that
retroactive application of the amendment would not result in
"inordinate, unusual, or unanticipatible harm. ' 218 Since the amendment specifically mandates apportionment only upon the employee's recovery, the Court concluded that the date of judgment or
29
settlement is controlling.
The Becker holding is clearly consistent with the policies underlying the workmen's compensation concept. Designed to spread
the risk of occupational injury, the compensation scheme places
particular emphasis on accomodating the injured employee. 2 1 Concern for the needs of the employee may be seen in a number of court
decisions giving retroactive effect to amendments granting exten221 increasing benefits 22
sions of time limitations for filing claims,
217Id. at 542, 373 N.E.2d at 1210, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 985. Compare Phillips v. Agway, Inc.,
88 Misc. 2d 1087, 389 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1976) (lien vests when
insurer applies first dollar to compensate claimant), with Cardillo v. Long Island College
Hosp., 86 Misc. 2d 438, 382 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1976) (lien does not vest
until recovery in third-party action).
21143 N.Y.2d at 537, 373 N.E.2d at 1207, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
" Id. at 542, 373 N.E.2d at 1210, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 985. Addressing the subsidiary issue
of computing the lienor's responsibility for a share of the litigation expenses, the Court noted
that the statute mandates "equitable" apportionment and that the Law Revision Commission explicitly rejected "a rigid statutory formula." Id. at 543, 373 N.E.2d at 1210, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 986 (citing N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 29; Recommendation of the Law Revision
Commission Relating to the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees in Third-Party Actions Under
Workmen's Compensation Law §§ 29 and 227, [1975] N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N REP., reprinted
in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1551, 1553 (McKinney)). The Court suggested that factors such as
standardized fees, the relative difficulty of prosecuting the case, and the possibility that a
fee was inflated in anticipation of the carrier's responsibility to share the expense, should be
weighed in determining an equitable division of the legal expenses. 43 N.Y.2d at 543, 373
N.E.2d at 1211, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 986. Other courts have also suggested methods for computing
the carrier's share of legal costs. Typically the percentage of litigation expenses which the
carrier must absorb is equal to the percentage of the total recovery which its lien represents.
See Wargo v. Longo, 85 Misc. 2d 898, 380 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1976);
Arman v. Marx, 85 Misc. 2d 406, 381 N.Y.S.2d 592 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1976).
See, e.g., Busch v. Austin Co., 37 App. Div. 2d 648, 322 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep't 1971)
(mem.); Mlodozeniec v. Worthington Corp., 9 App. Div. 2d 21, 189 N.Y.S.2d 468 (3d Dep't
1959), aff'd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 918, 168 N.E.2d 834, 204 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1960), cert. denied per
curiam, 364 U.S. 628 (1961); see note 214 supra.
2' See, e.g., McCann v. Walsh Constr. Co., 282 App. Div. 444, 123 N.Y.S.2d 509 (3d
Dep't 1953), aff'd mem., 306 N.Y. 904, 119 N.E.2d 596 (1954); Wood v. Queen City Neon Sign
Co., 282 App. Div. 106, 121 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't), appealdenied, 306 N.Y. 979, 115 N.E.2d
440 (1953).
21 See, e.g., De Concilus v. Juney Juniors, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 17, 189 N.Y.S.2d 466 (3d
Dep't 1959) (employee granted increased benefits pursuant to amendment enacted after
injury occurred and partial payments received); Schmidt v. Wolf Contracting Co., 269 App.
Div. 201, 55 N.Y.S.2d 162 (3d Dep't 1945), aff'd mem., 295 N.Y. 748, 65 N.E.2d 568 (1946)
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and expanding the scope of compensation coverage. 221 Such modifications are similar in effect to the 1975 amendment which reallocates the burden of the employee's litigation costs and indirectly
results in an increase in that portion of the recovery fund retained
by the injured employee. The Becker holding is thus in accord with
an established pattern of retroactively applying statutory modifications in order to confer added benefits upon the injured employee.
Moreover, the decision of the Becker Court to apply the 1975
amendment to settlements or judgments occurring after its effective
date is consistent with the policy of conditioning the carrier's right
to reimbursement upon the injured employee actually recovering in
a third-party action. 214 Since the carrier has no vested right to a
specific sum before the employee recovers,2 legislative modifications of interests in future recoveries are justifiable.
While the Becker Court's conclusions are legally and pragmatically sound, its holding may have a temporary adverse economic
effect on compensation carriers. By holding the carriers liable for a
proportionate share of legal expenses, the Court has imposed a burden that was not taken into account when initial insurance rates
were calculated. The balance that the carrier must maintain between cost and price is thereby disturbed.2 1 Ultimately, however,
the expenses now properly chargeable to the carrier under the
Becker holding will be absorbed by the general public. 21 It is submitted that this socialization of risk is appropriate in light of the
laudable purposes underlying the workmen's compensation system.
Kimberlee Bogen

(amendment effective June 1, 1944, temporarily increasing ceiling for disability payments
held applicable to claimant whose payments began in April 1944).
2 See note 215 supra.
221See N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAw § 29 (McKinney Supp. 1977-1978); notes 195-196 supra.
" See note 217 supra.
Z11See 43 N.Y.2d at 538, 373 N.E.2d at 1208, 1209, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
2v See J. BOYD, Tim LAW OF COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES TO WORKMEN 10 (1913); H.
SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 26 (1954); Atleson, supra note 197, at 516.

